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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

imposed by the lower court violated his equal protection rights
because his fines were greater than those imposed on previous
violators. The court rejected that claim because the evidence failed to
show DeCoster received unequal treatment. The court found that
DeCoster violated the Iowa statutes and regulations. The trial court
correctly found him strictly liable and imposed an appropriate fine.
Sheela S. Parameswar

KANSAS
Moon v. City of Lawrence, 982 P.2d 388 (Kan. 1999) (holding that the
homeowners' claims for personal and real property damage recovery
against the City, resulting from the storm water drainage system flood,
were barred by the statute of limitations).
Homeowners resided in a part of Lawrence, Kansas, which had a
history of water drainage problems. In 1958, the City of Lawrence
("City") constructed a complex drainage system. HQwever, within a
few years, the City became aware of the inadequacy of the drainage
system. Heavy rains rendered a portion of the drainage system
inadequate because the inlet pipe could not accommodate the large
amounts of water runoff. In the late 1960's, the City hired Black &
Veatch Consulting Engineers ("B & V") to examine different drainage
systems and identify solutions to those systems' problems. B & V
recognized the systems, including the Second and Michigan Street
Drainage System at issue here, as inadequate and suggested three
modes of action.
The City executed only two of B & V's
recommendations.
The recommendation that the City did not
perform constituted most of the financial burden.
Since the
implementation of B & V's two recommendations, the City had on
occasion inspected, maintained, and repaired the Second and
Michigan Street Drainage System.
Since 1969, an abundance of development occurred upstream
from the homeowners' properties.
Development included the
erection of the Holidome, the Sallie Mae Office Building with two
accompanying parking lots, and the Highpointe Apartments. The City
allowed each of these three sites to be completed with the knowledge
that each project did not require a storm water detention system
because of their nearness to the Second and Michigan Street Drainage
System.
The homeowners suffered substantial damage due to the flooding.
The homeowners alleged damages included: (1) severe yard flooding,
sometimes resulting in damage to outdoor property; (2) numerous
incidences of basement flooding, sometimes including property
damage; and (3) garage flooding. Each of the homeowners had
knowledge of the propensity of flooding between 1978 and 1993.
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The statute of limitations for an action alleging injury to another's
rights, not arising from a contractual agreement, is two years.
Additionally, a Kansas statute delineates that accrual of the cause of
action does not begin until the act giving rise to the cause of action
first causes substantial injury. The court had previously held that
"substantial injury" meant the victim must suffer a sufficient
ascertainable injury, regardless of the extent of that injury.
The court compared this situation with the 1996 decision in
Johnson v. Board of Pratt County Commissioners, which differed factually.
The Johnson court held that the statute of limitations did not
commence until after the 1991 flood; therefore, the cause of action
was not barred. In that case, a flood occurred in 1988, and the
plaintiffs promptly complained to the County. The County then took
action to prevent any future problems. Flooding again occurred in
1991, at which point the plaintiffs realized that the County had not
rectified the problem. Consequently, they filed suit.
The court also compared this situation with the decision of Isnard
v. City of Coffeyville. There the court held that the plaintiffs' injuries
due to flooding were reasonably ascertainable before the suit was filed
in October of 1991. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations
barred their cause of action. The court reasoned that past experiences
gave the plaintiffs satisfactory knowledge before October 1991 to
estimate the amount of rain needed to cause an overflow in the storm
sewer. Furthermore, the court held that the underground storm sewer
was a permanent structure, and the entire system needed replacement
in order to fix the flooding problem.
The court held that Isnardwas the applicable and controlling case.
The court stated that even if portions of the drainage system were
classified temporary, the classification did not preclude the entire
Second and Michigan Street Drainage System from being
characterized as a permanent structure. The homeowners had prior
knowledge of the flooding, and the City had not promised or tried to
abate the flooding. Consequently, the statute of limitations began to
run in 1993, thus barring the homeowners' cause of action.
Sara Franklin

LOUISIANA
Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 737 So.2d 720 (La. 1999) (holding that
the continued presence of a canal and the consequent diversion of
water from a bayou did not constitute a continuing tort since those
were continuous ill effects, not unlawful acts).
Sarah Crump sold eighteen of her sixty acres to Sabine River
Authority ("Authority") in 1965. The Authority used this land to
construct the Toledo Bend Reservoir. The McDonald Bayou traversed

